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With the advent of mass digitization projects, such as the Google Book Search, a pecu-
liar shift has occurred in the way that copyright works are dealt with. Contrary to
what has so far been the case, works are turned into machine-readable data to be
automatically processed for various purposes without the expression of works being
displayed to the public. In the Google Book Settlement Agreement, this new kind of
usage is referred to as ‘non-display uses’of digital works. The legitimacy of these uses
has not yet been tested by Courts and does not comfortably fit in the current copyright
doctrine, plainly because the works are not used as works but as something else,
namely as data. Since non-display uses may prove to be a very lucrative market in the
near future, with the potential to affect the way people use copyright works, we exam-
ine non-display uses under the prism of copyright principles to determine the bound-
aries of their legitimacy. Through this examination, we provide a categorization of the
activities carried out under the heading of ‘non-display uses’, we examine their
lawfulness under the current copyright doctrine and approach the phenomenon from
the spectrum of data protection law that could apply, by analogy, to the use of copy-
right works as processable data.
Keywords: digital copyright, digitization, digital libraries, non-display uses, Google
Books Settlement Agreement, transformative uses, data processing
INTRODUCTION
The concept of non-display use of digital works is newly born in the copyright world.
It made its first appearance about two years ago, in the proposed agreement to settle
the class action brought by the Author’s Guild of the United States against Google for
the activities carried out within the Google Books project.1 According to the purely
negative definition put forward in the Agreement, non-display uses of digital works
are those carried out without displaying the expression of digital copies of works to
the public.2 In practice, they include any sort of automated processing of works for
purposes of data mining, computational analysis on texts and automatic extraction of
information. All these forms of processing may in turn enable the development of
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tools such as automated translation and targeted advertising software. Although these
uses prove to be extremely profitable, and are even likely to be the most valuable part
of the Agreement,3 their legitimacy under copyright law and principles has not yet
been subject to scrutiny. Are these uses just copyright-irrelevant on the ground that
they do not entail the display of the work to the public? Or should they, alternatively,
amount to copyright infringement on the mere ground that they presuppose the
repeated making of copies of the work?
In this article, we suggest that non-display uses tend to escape the traditional
contours of copyright. This begs for a regulatory framework based on broader legal
principles. In particular, we maintain that non-display uses of digital works are better
captured under the heading of ‘automated data processing’, and as such they may be
more conveniently examined through the lens of data protection law rather than that
of copyright law per se. In fact, the analogy between uses of copyright works as data-
containers and uses of personal data may enable development of a consistent regula-
tory framework for automated processing of copyright works.
Yet, at the same time, non-display uses offer an interesting insight on an emerging
– and so far almost unnoticed – phenomenon of the so-called digital era. While digi-
tal technology has dramatically altered the method by which works are reproduced
and distributed, it seems that the time has come when digital technology purely affects
the way that works are used. Works are no longer massively reproduced and distrib-
uted to be appropriated by human beings only, as has so far been the case! The core
meaning of non-display uses is clearly captured in the reported words of an anony-
mous Google engineer: ‘we’re not scanning all those books to be read by people.
We’re scanning them to be read by Artificial Intelligence.’4
In this light, we feel that mass digitization projects, such as Google Books, mark a
conceptual shift in the way that digital works are used and dealt with. Whereas the
advent of digital technologies leads to the dematerialization of works by skipping the
necessity for a tangible carrier, with mass digitization works are somewhat de-intel-
lectualized, as they are detached from the very condition of their being, namely their
intelligibility to humans. Similarly to what occurs when a source code of a computer
program is turned into an object code, digital copies are dealt with as mere containers
of data, from which information may be automatically extracted and used without
being exposed to human eyes and human intelligence. Is this use compatible with the
purpose for which works are created and disseminated? Does it fit the legitimate
understanding of what a use of a work properly is? Or does it rather involve, some-
how, a violation of the intimate nature of a work?
In this article, we examine the legitimacy of non-display uses carried out in the
light of mass digitization, acknowledging that the legal issues arising in this context
go beyond the Google Books case and entail a more fundamental question on what are
the legitimate uses of data which virtually include the heritage of all humankind.5 Our
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purpose is to provide some guidance in defining the legal boundaries of these uses, by
reference to the principles of copyright law. The main question that we shall therefore
address is the extent to which large-scale digitization projects are entitled to make use
of copyright works for automated processing.
This article is divided into two parts. In Part One, we examine what non-display uses
are in the context of the Google Book Settlement Agreement, we review the judiciary
arguments in the US and Europe on the lawfulness of such uses as well as the ratio-
nales supporting and opposing the view that non-display uses should be put under the
rightholders’ control. In Part Two, we discuss a regulatory framework for non-display
uses based on a purpose-driven analysis of the activities that are carried out under this
heading; guidance will be sought eventually from the analogy between uses of works
as data-containers and the automated processing of personal data.
PART ONE UNDERSTANDING NON-DISPLAY USES
Digitizing a literary work is an act implying two different operations. First, the book
(or any other physical carrier) is ‘scanned’, namely it is copied page by page and
converted into a series of digital images. Second, the digital images are processed by
optical character recognition (OCR) software, which converts the image into a text
file.6 The first operation creates a copy of the work, as with other reproduction tech-
nologies such as photography and reprography. The second operation, i.e. OCR-ing,
is qualitatively different from mere copying. Its purpose is not just to ‘reproduce’ the
work, namely to multiply copies to be perceived by human intelligence,7 but to
modify the format of the work so as to make the copy readable by computers.8
Thereby, an object which can be read (only) by humans, such as a book’s page or a
picture thereof, is turned into a machine-readable entity. As a result, the work’s text
can be not only reproduced, but also processed by other applications. For example,
the text may become searchable on a word-by-word basis, and information for index-
ing the work may be automatically extracted.
Mass digitization of books entails both these operations – scanning and OCR-ing –
on a large scale. The aggregate result of this ongoing digitization is that a number of
resources which were available only in print form, or on other physical carriers, are
turned into a huge corpus of machine-readable data. In this part, we examine some of
the effects that this alteration to the format of books triggers. We will show that while
isolated acts of digitization may have the sole purpose of indexing books and making
them searchable by users, the cumulative effect of those single acts on a massive scale
creates the conditions for new, unprecedented uses of works – or rather, as we will see
later on in this article, for uses on works.9 Below we examine what these ‘non-display
uses’ are in the context of Google Books and of the ongoing case of Author’s Guild v
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Google.10 Our focus will be on the relevant provisions of the Agreement that have
been proposed by the parties to settle the case.11
1 Non-display uses in the Google Books Settlement Agreement
In 2004, when Google announced its ambitious project of making all the world’s books
traceable and searchable online, the attention of users and observers mainly focused on
the possibility of locating information quickly and at no cost in an unprecedented corpus
of books; this was the public side of the project, namely the fact that millions of books
were about to be made available online for searching and reading. Google itself
presented its project as a comprehensive search engine for full text search of books,
rather than as a library in the classic sense of the term.12 The policy of the project has
remained unaltered since its beginning: scanning books, making them fully searchable
on the web, then seeking permission from copyright holders to display their books by
offering them a place in a partnership programme.13 In case the rightholders reject this
offer, the book remains non-displayed to users, with the exception of short excerpts
(‘snippets’) made available in response to users’ search queries. While the project’s
policy has been described by David Nimmer as ‘turn[ing] copyright law on its head’14
– since copyright is normally about seeking permission before engaging in a restricted
act, and not after! – Google’s practice may be justifiable on other grounds.15 For
instance, clearing rights in mass digitization projects may be a very arduous task, some-
times even impossible, as it would raise unprecedented transaction costs.16 In this light,
the exclusivity afforded to the reproduction right seems to be an insurmountable obsta-
cle for the making of a universal searching tool, which is a socially valuable goal.
© 2011 The Author Journal compilation © 2011 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
10. Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136, filed 20 September 2005.
11. Any discussion about the likely outcome of the lawsuit or about the fairness of the
proposed Agreement as such remains beyond the scope of this article. For a comprehensive
discussion of the Google Books case see P Samuelson, ‘Google Book Search and the Future of
Books in Cyberspace’ (2010) 94(5) Minnesota Law Review; see also P Samuelson, ‘Is the
Proposed Google Book Settlement Fair?’ (2010) 2. AMI: Tijdschrift voor Auteurs, Media &
Informatierecht 50 60, available at <http://www.ischool.berkeley. edu/~pam>. For a bibliogra-
phy of academic articles and papers on the Authors Guild v Google case see <http://thepublicin-
dex.org>.
12. See eg L Vincent, ‘Google Book Search: Document Understanding on a Massive Scale’,
International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition, ICDAR 2007, Curitiba,
Brazil, September 2007, available at <http://www.vincent-net.com/luc/papers/07icdar_google-
books.pdf> (describing the main technical features of Google Book Search project). Also see P
Samuelson, ‘Google Books is Not a Library’, The Huffington Post, 13 October 2009, available
at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pamela-samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-lib_b_317518.
html> (discussing the differences between commercial ventures like Google Books and tradi-
tional libraries).
13. The partnership programme provides a range of schemes, under which a book can be
displayed in whole or in part (see Vincent ‘Google Book Search’, (n 12) 2).
14. Fairness Hearing Transcript, Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136 (18
February 2010) 46.
15. As Neil Netanel puts it, ‘Google’s scanning and public display of mere snippets of in-
copyright books [...] should be fair use’ (Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (OUP 2008) 212).
16. This is eg the case with the copyright orphans. See in this respect RC Picker, ‘The Google
Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan Works Monopoly?’, (2009) 5(3) Journal of
Competition Law & Economics, 383–409, and HR Varian, ‘Copyright Term Extension and
Orphan Works’ (2006) 15(6) Industrial and Corporate Change, 965–80, at 976.
 
Non-display uses of copyright works: Google Books and beyond 25
The judiciary history is well known: in September 2005, the Author’s Guild
Association of America, together with five publishers, sued Google for copyright
infringement.17 In October 2008, the parties announced a settlement, which was later
amended and it is still awaiting judicial approval.18 Under the Agreement authors will
have the possibility of contracting with Google only over the display uses of their work.
As regards non-display uses, however, their value and potential impact has been, and
still is, underestimated both by Google’s counterparts in the lawsuits and by observers.
Probably this has to do with the fact that most of these uses are still in their infancy, and
one can only speculate what their value might be in the future.19 It was only in one of
the objections to the agreement that the issue of non-display uses has been brought up,
according to which the plaintiffs ‘have ignored both the critical issue of control over
Non-Display Uses of their works and the potentially enormous value of such uses’.20
This mainly has to do with the definition given to non-display uses in the
Agreement, which has been kept deliberately broad and vague. Non-display uses are
defined as ‘uses that do not display Expression from Digital Copies of Books or
Inserts to the public’.21 Among others, these uses include ‘display of bibliographic
information, full-text indexing without display of Expression (such as listing the
number or location of search matches), geographic indexing of Books, algorithmic
listings of key terms for chapters of Books, and internal research and development
using Digital Copies’.22 Under the Agreement, Google is authorized to make non-
display uses of all books contained in the corpus23 and copyright holders have a
‘right’ to have their books ‘removed’ from the corpus.24 Yet, such ‘right’ is not unlim-
ited in scope and, most importantly, it is limited in terms of time.25 After a given
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deadline, copyright holders are entitled to have their books ‘excluded’ only from some
or from all the display uses.26 Nonetheless, a right to exclude is different from a right
to remove, in that the author can have her books only inaccessible to users, but not
eliminated from the corpus. As Pamela Samuelson explains: ‘even if the author asks
for her book to be removed from [Google Books], this does not mean that Google will
actually purge them from its servers; these books will just be less accessible than if
the author hadn’t asked for them to be removed’.27 Practically, this means that authors
do not have any means of control over non-display uses.
Most of the activities related to non-display uses fall under the umbrella term of
‘[Google’s] internal research and development using Digital Copies’.28 Broadly
speaking, research and development include four ranges of activities involving data
and text mining.29
First, there are activities of data analysis to improve search algorithms. As a
Google engineer has observed, ‘the very worst [search] algorithm at 10 million words
is better than the very best algorithm at 1 million words’. In this light, Google Books
is a formidable increase in the quantity of data that Google’s search engine can
process, in order to improve the ‘core business’ of Google, namely its search engine.30
Note that – at least to date – books forming the corpus of Google books are accessi-
ble only from Google’s search engine; they do not feature in the search results of other
search engines like Yahoo! or Bing.
A second group of activities relate to more sophisticated text analysis. For instance,
the content of a book, or of the whole production of a particular author, may be
analysed to extract information, which in turn may be sold ‘to third-party behavioral
advertisers so that they could direct ads to people running searches for that [book or]
author’s work’.31
Further activities relate to analysis of meta-data on the use of digital copies. This data
analysis is carried out on the search patterns of users so as to create databases of user
profiles. By running users’ queries against the database of book content, Google ‘could
compile dossiers on individual users’, which ‘would allow Google to personalize 
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emphasis added).
26. Ibid, § 3.5(b)(i) (‘Right to exclude’).
27. Letter of Pamela Samuelson to Judge Chin on behalf of academic authors, in Opposition
to the Settlement Agreement, Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136 (3
September 2009) 8. See also Guthrie’s Objection (n 20) 18: ‘Removal would not prevent
Google from generating additional electronic records relating to Books [...], and using such
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28. Amended Settlement Agreement, § 1.94.
29. Data mining is defined in the computer sciences as the ‘extraction of implicit, previously
unknown, and potentially useful information from data’, with the aim of looking for ‘patterns
in data’ (IH Witten and E Frank, Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and
Techniques (Elsevier, San Francisco 2005) 9). Likewise, text mining is ‘the process of analyz-
ing text to extract information that is useful for particular purposes’ (ibid, 351). As applied to
literary works, text mining is about finding ‘structural patterns’ in texts, extracting information
out of these patterns and combining them with data on the use of work (such as data on works
search and access).
30. Objection of Yahoo! Inc. to Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No.
1:05-CV-08136 (8 September 2009) 25.
31. Guthrie’s Objection (n 20) 19.
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advertisements to or aim products at specific users’.32 Information about how many
times a work is being searched, by whom it is searched, for how long it is browsed,
or about the online communities that flourish around it, may be processed for numer-
ous purposes, including behavioural analysis and personalized advertising.33 Analysis
of books’ content, combined with processing of meta-data on the books’ uses, may
prove to be a powerful means for targeted marketing purposes.34
Fourth, non-display uses include a number of activities which are not directly func-
tional in nature. In the language of the proposed Agreement, these latter uses fall
under the definition of ‘Non-Consumptive Research’. This is defined as ‘research in
which computational analysis is performed on one or more Books, but not research in
which a researcher reads or displays substantial portions of a Book to understand the
intellectual content presented within the Book’.35 Contrary to what is commonly
believed, the main research value of a corpus of millions digitized books does not
consist only, and not primarily, in the ease of locating sources and information to be
accessed by readers. As it has been straightforwardly pointed out: ‘different from our
current understanding of a library, this corpus of works would not be made available
for the purpose of reading the works. Instead, this group of works is intended to be
made available for computational analysis’.36 As opposed to the traditional research
uses of books, this kind of uses which is based on computational analysis does not aim
at either displaying the book or appropriating its content. It includes image analysis
and text extraction,37 textual analysis and information extraction,38 linguistic analy-
sis,39 automatic translation,40 and indexing and search.41
Under the proposed Agreement, only ‘qualified users’ will have access to the
corpus of Google Books to conduct non-consumptive research,42 under a detailed
© 2011 The Author Journal compilation © 2011 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
32. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae The Internet Archive in Opposition to Amended
Settlement Agreement, Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136 (27 January
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33. These uses raise specific privacy issues, which remain outside the scope of this article. For
a summary of privacy-related issues, see Privacy Authors and Publishers’ Objection to Proposes
Settlement, Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136 (8 September 2009).
34. See H Barry, ‘New Technological Uses’, slides presentation, available at
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/statuteofanne/pdf/Barry.pdf>.
35. Amended Settlement Agreement, § 1.93 (‘Non-Consumptive Research’).
36. The Stanford University Libraries Amicus Letter in Support of the Settlement Agreement,
Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136 (8 September 2009) 4.
37. ‘Computational analysis of the Digitized image artifact to either improve the image (eg,
de-skewing) or extracting textual or structural information from the image (eg, OCR).’
Amended Settlement Agreement, § 1.93(a).
38. ‘Automated techniques designed to extract information to understand or develop relation-
ships among or within Books or, more generally, in the body of literature contained within the
Research Corpus. This category includes tasks such as concordance development, collocation
extraction, citation extraction, automated classification, entity extraction, and natural language
processing’, ibid, § 1.93(b).
39. ‘Research that performs linguistic analysis over the Research Corpus to understand
language, linguistic use, semantics and syntax as they evolve over time and across different
genres or other classifications of Books’, ibid, § 1.93(c).
40. ‘Research on techniques for translating works from one language to another’, ibid, §
1.93(d).
41. ‘Research on different techniques for indexing and search of textual content’ ibid, §
1.93(e).
42. Ibid, § 7.2(b)(vi) (‘Use for Non-Consumptive Research’). ‘Qualified users’ can only be
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series of limitations.43 For instance, these users are allowed to publish their results or
to exploit algorithms developed when performing research; they are, however, forbid-
den from using data extracted from the corpus of Google Books to develop commer-
cial products or services that would compete with those offered by Google.44 As
Pamela Samuelson rightly observes, the limitations over non-consumptive research
‘will preclude [researchers] from becoming next-generation entrepreneurs capable of
developing radically new information services arising from their non-consumptive
uses of the [Google Books] corpus’.45 In our view, the Agreement designs a troubling
deal between Google and the academic and research world: researchers are given
access to a hugely valuable stock of data and Google has a monopoly over the incor-
poration of their research results into commercial products or services.
Computational analysis on a corpus of millions of books opens up possibilities that
scholars can now only imagine. Inter-linguistical analysis may help refining tech-
niques of automated translation. ‘Associative’ and ‘taxonomic searching tools’ may
provide ‘access to ideas more or less independent of the exact expressions of ideas
across many texts’.46 Researchers may track and quantify ‘influences’, ‘cultural
exchanges’ and the absorption of ‘cultural values’ from different areas of the world
and can quantify phenomenon such as ‘the evolution of grammar, collective memory,
the adoption of technology, the pursuit of fame, censorship, and historical epidemiol-
ogy’.47 They may also compare and contrast ‘contemporary views of events’ and
‘philosophies from different national and linguistic context’.48 In a way, works are no
longer used as works, but as containers of data from which information is automati-
cally extracted.
These techniques of automated text analysis as applied to a corpus containing virtu-
ally all the world’s information are still in their infancy, and the possibilities that they
will open up in the future are largely unforeseeable. To a distinguished classicist, ‘the
Google collection can be for us comparable to historical projects such as the Human
Genome and the Sloan Sky Survey’.49 And as is the case with these groundbreaking
projects, the digitization of the world’s books will certainly lead to unpredictable
consequences for the method by which humankind will make use of works of literature
and science. Similarly to what occurs with the Human Genome, here the only legal
point is whether such a project, and the resulting uses, ought to be regulated or whether
it should remain – as currently – the wild ‘land of pioneers and of the long hunters’.50
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45. Samuelson (n 11) 1353.
46. The Stanford University Libraries Amicus Letter (n 36) 5. The technique of extracting
‘key ideas’ from books is explained in BN Schilit and O Kolak. ‘Exploring a Digital Library
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Author’s Guild, Inc. v Google, Inc., No 1:05-CV-08136 (7 August 2009) 1.
50. TJ Skeyhill Sergeant York: Last of the Long Hunters, quoted in JE Smith, Reconstructing
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In the following, we discuss the legitimacy of non-display uses in the light of the
current US and European jurisprudence.
2 How US and European jurisprudence (would) deal with non-display uses
The legitimacy of non-display uses has as yet been neither properly tested by courts
nor reviewed by scholars. In fact, many scholars have commented on whether the
activities carried out within the Google Books project are covered by the fair use
defence under US law.51 In their majority, scholars argue that scanning (and OCR-ing)
for purposes of indexing and search is fair use, and this is also considered to be the
most probable judicial ruling, should the case Authors Guild v Google ever come to a
conclusion in court.52
One might also argue that the making of non-display uses on copyright-protected
works is inevitable in the age of the internet. For instance David Drummond, Chief
Legal Officer of Google, describes Google’s activity as doing for books what it is
commonly done for any other resources on the web, namely ‘making copies and
indexing the text to make it searchable’. He adds: ‘[t]oday it is understood that the act
of copying the web to index it is a fair use under our nation’s copyright laws. Fair use
is the very reason search engines exist’.53 Although in Drummond’s testimony there
is no mention of non-display uses, his argument may find support both in the jurispru-
dence and in the common practice. After a work is being scanned and OCR-ed, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line between what is necessary for making
the work accessible through searching and what exceeds this purpose. As a conse-
quence, it might be argued that any such uses should be prima facie permitted, unless
they cause harm to an author’s economic or moral rights.
Yet, the point is that ‘indexing and search’ is neither the only nor perhaps the most
relevant purpose for which works are scanned and OCR-ed. Most of the activities that
fall under the umbrella term of non-display uses do not relate to indexing and search.
What does data mining and computational text analysis have to do with the purpose
of indexing a work and making it searchable to users? Are all such activities covered
by the fair use defence?
To Pamela Samuelson, who first drew attention to the relevance and legal implica-
tions of non-display uses,54 Google could have a plausible fair use defence for these
uses too. This is because ‘non-display uses of the [Google Books] corpus would likely
result in advancing knowledge and/or in the creation of new non-infringing works of
authorship, such as new tools to aid in the translation of texts from one language to
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another’.55 These uses would be ‘transformative’ under the conditions established by
the American jurisprudence,56 and as such ‘are unlikely to bring about any harm or
potential harm to the market for the underlying work’.57
Although non-display uses in mass digitization projects have not yet been brought
to, and examined by, American courts, the finding of fair use might be supported by
a line of cases on internet search engines. In Kelly v Arriba Soft Corporation,58 the
appeal court found that the creation of thumbnails of in-copyright works passed the
fair use test and qualified as a permissible transformative use. In determining whether
Arriba’s use of the images was transformative, the court found that the use had merely
to supersede the object of the original pictures or add a further purpose or different
character to the pictures. Following this test, the court found that Arriba’s use of
Kelly’s images as thumbnails was transformative.59 A similar holding was made in
two other cases on the reproduction of images by a search engine for purposes of
searching and indexing.60 Yet, in none of these cases have uses exceeding the purpose
of indexing and searching been examined, as is the case with most of the non-display
uses carried out by Google.
However, a case which has many similarities with Google’s non-display uses has
been recently discussed in the US. In iParadigms, the storage and processing of
students’ courseworks by an online service for detecting plagiarism was found to be a
fair use.61 In particular, the appeals court upheld the district court’s decision by taking
the stance that archiving the student works for the automated evaluation of original-
ity of other student’s works did not infringe copyright. This applied irrespective of the
fact that iParadigms was carrying out a commercial operation.62 Rather, the court
found the use in question to be transformative on the basis that the use of the papers
was made ‘for an entirely different purpose [from the original], namely, to prevent
plagiarism and protect the students’ written works from plagiarism’.63 This use of the
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student works ‘did not impair the market value’ – if any – ‘for high school term papers
and other such student works’.64 The fact that there was no substantial alteration to the
original works was not found as a barrier of establishing transformativeness in the use.65
If such broad interpretation of transformativeness is adopted, it is easy to predict that
many non-display uses will benefit from a fair-use defence in American courts.
Certainly, given the international dimension of the Google Books case, considering this
case only through the lens of the US copyright doctrine is too restrictive. A project like
Google Books is by definition transnational, not only in the sense that a digital library
on the internet is accessible from everywhere in the world, but also in the sense that
books in the corpus come from different languages and traditions and cover virtually all
the world’s cultural heritage. As a matter of fact, the activities underlying the Google
Books project are less likely to be permitted in Europe,66 and they have actually been
found infringing in France.67 Although the French decision did not discuss non-display
uses, it seems that the activities ranged under this umbrella term have little hope of find-
ing a plausible defence in that jurisdiction.68 This is because, under European jurisdic-
tions, unauthorized reproduction of the whole work has no passe partout defence
comparable to that of American fair use. Defences such as that for private copying or for
reproduction for educational purposes apply neither to public commercial ventures, such
as Google Books, nor probably to the making of digital libraries in general.69 In the UK,
the defence of fair dealing is too narrow in scope to cover massive reproduction of copy-
right works for purposes of automatic search and indexing.70 Non-display uses of digi-
tal copies inevitably require the reproduction of the whole work – not only as obvious
prerequisite (a ‘copy’ must initially be made), but as condition for these uses as such
(permanent and/or temporary copies of the work are repeatedly made in the course of
the automated processing). Therefore, if the initial copy made is the result of unlawful
reproduction, the legitimacy of every other subsequent act made in respect of that copy
is tainted by the unlawfulness of the first act and may be infringing – according to the
principle flowing from the Roman maxim: fraus omnia corrumpit.
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3 Copyright-irrelevant uses? Views from the copyright field
The current jurisprudence seems to design a legal paradox: while invasive and
economically significant activities on copyright works, such as those of data mining,
are likely to be exempt from infringement, an act of reproduction that might be poten-
tially innocent is, at least in Europe, straightforwardly infringing, irrespective of its
aim and purpose. In our view, both sides of this paradox lead to legally uncertain
conclusions. This is because the fact that works are not displayed to the public cannot
sufficiently establish that all activities falling under the umbrella term of non-display
uses are copyright irrelevant. At the same time, determining the lawfulness of an act
of reproduction requires an examination of the purpose for which the copy was made.
Indicative in this respect is the fact that, even though reproduction is an exclusive
right under every jurisdiction, acts of reproduction may escape liability on the basis
of their purpose.71
To determine the legitimacy of non-display uses, it is essential to review the argu-
ments that may support the view that non-display uses should be put under righthold-
ers’ control, as well as those opposing this view.
(a) Work as object of property (and counter-arguments)
Some authors objecting the Google Books Settlement Agreement72 view non-display
uses as a very lucrative market which is still in its infancy, or, otherwise put, as ‘the
very core of Google’s powerful revenue engine’.73 To them, this market will deter-
mine ‘both how authors’ creative works will be exploited and how authors will be
compensated’.74 In this light, granting Google an irrevocable licence to exploit such
uses is just ‘grossly unfair to authors’.75 Certainly, these new uses generate a ‘value’
over which many parties have a legitimate claim. It is not clear on which grounds all
the value should be appropriated by one party only, namely the ‘user’! Moreover, the
pro-authors’ argument finds an orthodox justification in the copyright discourse,
according to which rights should extend to all economically valuable uses of the work.
This prescription is considered to be consistent with the very purpose and logic of
copyright, which is that of enabling authors’ works to reach the widest possible audi-
ence. As Paul Goldstein classically puts it: ‘the best prescription for connecting
authors to their audience is to extend rights into every corner where consumers derive
value from literary and artistic works’.76 On this basis, it can be argued that authors
have a right in all uses of their works from which value can be derived, and these are
not necessarily uses which display the content to the public. For instance, in relation
to uses of data about books’ uses – who reads them, where they are read, what
keywords are searched for, and in what context – it has been argued that the author
may have a legitimate entitlement to participate in the economic value that is derived
from their exploitation. This is because, as the former CEO of Napster, Hank Barry,
has put it, increasingly a work of authorship is not only an ‘object’ but a shared object,
that is ‘a powerful social connector’ which is, or has the potential to be, a ‘node’ or a
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locus for online communities, the latter being ‘powerful generators of money’. If this
is the case, then an author should have a right to ‘participate in the economic benefit
of a community formed around [her] work’.77
This ‘expansive’ approach to copyright has become a source of criticism.78 As far
as non-display uses are concerned, one might argue for instance that the beneficial
effects of having works easily retrievable and accessible outweigh the alleged unfair-
ness to authors. This argument could find a public interest basis, but also be supported
from the narrower viewpoint of authors and rightholders. Indexing and search in large
databases could bring back to life works that lay forgotten on libraries’ shelves and
were out of print. Algorithms may enable the meeting of works with potential reader-
ship. Personalized advertising and behavioural analysis are essential ingredients in
order to exploit the potential of the web as a distribution system. This model promises
to ‘match geographically dispersed buyers to a product of their choice efficiently’, in
all the cases where ‘the limited demand for each individual title would not have
proved to be sufficient under the old distribution model’.79 In this light, one might
conclude that non-display uses are as necessary in the web-based distribution as pack-
aging and shipping was in the old distribution model. In the prospect of an unprece-
dented availability of works to the benefit of both the authors and the public, it would
be more efficient to leave, as packaging and shipping were and still are non-display
uses outside the author’s control.
However illuminating might be the comparison of the new and old worlds, the util-
itarian approaches do not help much in finding a sound regulatory principle for non-
display uses. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to see how the chimerical ‘right balance’
between authors and users could be substantiated by sheer reference to works as
values and to works’ uses as appropriation of values.80 Obviously, by not being regu-
lated, the value generated by non-display uses is entirely appropriated by users, or
rather by the only user which has currently both the know-how and the resources to
exploit them, namely Google. Is this a welcome outcome of the counter-proprietary
argument? In spite of the declared aim of ‘striking the right balance’ between authors
and users, a value-based approach may be unfit to provide guidance in determining
the scope of, respectively, authors’ and users’ rights over non-display uses.81
(b) Work as communicative act
Under a more consistent approach, a work of authorship is primarily an act of commu-
nication, in the sense that it bears a speech addressed by an author to the public by
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means of an intermediary.82 From this perspective, the author–user relationship is not
a struggle in view of appropriating value but rather an ongoing dialogue between
collaborative parties.83 The use of a work may be restricted not on the basis that it
results in a misappropriation of value, but on the ground that it encroaches on an act
of communication between the author and the public. As a consequence, an act is
restricted either when it forces an author to speak against her will, as is the case with
unauthorized publication,84 or when it otherwise interferes with the modalities chosen
by the author to speak to the public.85 To what extent do non-display uses encroach
on the communicative act in which the work consists?
It is worth noting that the right to communicate the work to the public (via publi-
cation, reproduction, distribution or otherwise) is necessarily an exclusive right
under this approach. This is because the act of communication implies that the inter-
mediary (e.g. the publisher) speaks to the public in the name of the author, and this
can only be done through an explicit mandate of the author. Otherwise put, an
author does not merely have a right to be compensated for the use that the interme-
diary makes of her work but, more importantly, an exclusive right to choose who is
authorized to speak in her own name. This means that no intermediary can speak in
an author’s name on the sole ground that he is not causing any harm – or that he is
even bringing about advantages – to the author.
So, whereas some may see non-display uses as not harmful to authors, these uses
could have some unprecedented impact upon the way the author’s word is delivered
to the public. Despite the fact that the work as such is not displayed, it may be indexed
or appear as the result of search queries in an environment becoming more and more
shaped by search algorithms. In this light, non-display uses will increasingly deter-
mine the context in which works will be communicated to the public. The absence of
any control over non-display uses might result, for example, ‘in advertisements being
positioned next to or associated with authors’ work in ways that are objectionable,
offensive, or harmful to the author’.86 Automatic associations may be generated as
effect of ‘groups attempting to create a false appearance of endorsement’.87 More
subtly, behaviours of groups of readers which use an author’s work for own purposes,
for instance to support own political views, may influence algorithms so that the
author will be automatically associated with those views.
While the practice of misleadingly appropriating authors and works for political or
ideological aims – a practice which we may term ‘author squatting’ – is as old as
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humankind,88 its use as a source of information to produce automatically generated
associations is brand new. In this respect, computational analysis of language, coupled
with aggregated data mining, may associate an author with other authors, products, or
even ‘ideas’ independently from their expression. In a ‘reading environment’ deter-
mined by non-display uses, for instance, a book might not be available for viewing
and reading, but users might catch its ‘key idea’ as extracted via automatic text
processing; they might even be readdressed to authors which allegedly share ‘similar-
ities’ or even ‘similar ideas’ based on associative and taxonomic data analysis.89 A
work which has been searched may not be available for viewing, or may be available
only upon payment, but the search engine may still provide users with any sort of
proxies – spanning from snippets, quotes, cross-referencing, or even ‘key ideas’. This
means that, irrespective of whether the work as such is displayed by the intermediary,
or is only made searchable by it, computer-generated associations may deeply inter-
fere with the modalities chosen by the author to communicate her work to the public.
(c) Work as manifestation of personality – and the use thereof
Apart from the impact on the way in which the work is communicated, an author may
not be content with certain uses of her work. For instance, an author may be uncom-
fortable with the automated processing of her work for the extraction of information
over the work’s access and use, or for the development of commercial products. She
might also find that automated textual analysis applied to her work is detrimental to
her dignity as author, or, simply, that this kind of automated processing of human
language is contrary to her principles as author. A poet might find the use of her words
as ‘semantic units’ in the context of computational linguistic analysis disturbing,
simply because she believes that words are not to be ‘used’ in this way. Similarly, a
philosopher might object to the automatic extraction of ideas from her books, on the
very simple ground that, as Charles Dickens masterfully expressed, ‘an idea, like a
ghost, must be spoken to a little before it will explain itself’.
The point here is whether an author has a legitimate claim to oppose such uses on
the ground of own judgement and beliefs. Certainly, a claim of this kind can be
substantiated only on the assumption that an indissoluble link exists between the
author and the work, so that the first is – to a certain extent – entitled to oppose certain
uses of the latter once it has been released to the public. The personality right theory
provides support to this argument.
The assumption of author’s rights under the umbrella of personality rights is
commonly referred to Hegel.90 In fact, Hegel explicitly treats the legal meaning of the
‘products of the intellect’ under the heading of ‘goods, or rather substantive determi-
nations [...], which constitute my own person and the universal essence of my self-
consciousness in the deepest sense’.91 Contrary to what is sometimes superficially
reported, this does not mean that the work should be seen as an ‘expression’ or even
as an ‘emanation’ of ‘the author’s personality’, as would be – legally speaking – the
‘smell of landfill gas and litter [...] emanating from domestic waste’.92 The author is
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not the ‘owner’ of her ‘emanations’ in the way that people are holders of any smells
emanating from their own properties. For Hegel, ‘personality’ is not an empirical
concept describing a sort of ‘internal sphere’ as opposed to external manifestations
thereof; it is a purely abstract concept which defines the human being in its capacity
to possess rights, and not only to be subject of legal relationships.93
Accordingly, when it comes to ‘things’ which have an existence as such but, at the
same time, are substantial determinations of one’s own personality, the question arises
as to whether, and to what extent, these ‘things’ maintain a link with the person once
they are separated from it and, so to speak, attain a life on their own. So, for instance,
when an author alienates the work (or a copy thereof) to a buyer, the latter comes into
possession of both ‘the possibility [...] to appropriate the thoughts that are communi-
cated through it’ and of ‘the universal way and manner to express oneself in the same
way’.94 However, while the buyer acquires whole possession of the first possibility,
as it constitutes ‘the sole destination and the value’ of an object such as a literary
work, she has no right to make use of the second element, namely the power to
‘produce the work in the same way’. This latter is a special kind of use which is
‘different and separate from the use to which the object was directly appointed’.95 The
purpose of publication is therefore to enable other human beings to appropriate the
author’s thoughts; it is not that of facilitating the reproduction of the work in the same
way.96
While this argument has so far provided the justification for the reproduction right,
it may also form the justificatory ground for restrictions on other uses of the work
which are unrelated to the use to which the work was directly appointed. Otherwise
put, it could justify a right of the author to have her work used in the context of content
appropriation but not for purposes disconnected from this one, since other purposes
could come in conflict with the inherent purpose of the work. In this light, the fact that
reproduction has been so far the only meaningful case of a use not related to the
intended function of the work does not mean that this should remain the only restricted
use of an author’s work.
The non-display use of digital works is a new technologically empowered activity
that does not seem to relate to the inherent purpose and function of works, namely
content appropriation. At the same time, it does not feature in the list of restricted acts
as reproduction is, probably due to the fact that copyright doctrine has not so far
encountered anything analogous to this kind of use. In the next part we discuss these
issues with a view to defining a regulatory principle for non-display uses.
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PART TWO REGULATING NON-DISPLAY USES
Non-display uses do not involve the dissemination of the work to the public, but may
deeply interfere with its dissemination. Neither are non-display uses pure uses of the
work, since they do not aim at performing the only reasonable use for which a book
is published, namely reading and learning from its content; the ideas expressed in
books are not ‘spoken to’ so as to explain themselves and be perceptible! Since the
life of copyright has been shaped by the test of time and subversive technologies, it is
important to see how non-display uses of works may be regulated from a copyright
perspective.
To be sure, the current lack of regulation over non-display uses triggers the emer-
gence of private ordering mechanisms. Contracts preventing text mining are already
used in the context of digitization projects, such as that of British Library,97 and these
contractual restrictions are fated to be more frequent in future contracts between
authors and digital libraries, or between libraries and digitization projects.98 However,
the contractual route cannot be a viable solution as regards mass digitization projects,
which mainly include works in the public domain or works whose rightholder cannot
be located.99 Should contracts over non-display uses be permissible, this would gener-
ate legal uncertainty, since the corpus of a digital library would be fragmented
between several legal conditions of use. This calls for a comprehensive regulation of
non-display uses that is applicable ex ante to copyright works, and cannot possibly be
overridden by contract.
It should be borne in mind that the term ‘non-display uses’ covers a range of acts,
spanning from those necessary to make the work searchable by users, to more sophis-
ticated processes. Not all of those activities can be justified on the mere ground that
they are necessary to make a digital library or a search engine. In our view, non-
display uses essentially involve two copyright-significant activities. First, they require
the copying of the works for the purposes of indexing and search. Copying in this
context entails both the creation of temporary copies, and the scanning and OCR-ing
of works. Secondly, the copies that are created are automatically processed. Automatic
processing may be carried out for computational analysis, i.e. non-consumptive
research, or for purposes of data mining. Below, we examine these activities with a
view to determining a regulatory framework for non-display uses.
1 Copying for indexing and search
Mass digitization projects are premised upon the creation of copies of works. While
the case of temporary copies is settled by copyright law, in terms that the creation of
such copies is exempt from infringement under certain conditions,100 the situation of
scanning and OCR-ing may not be equally straightforward. To examine whether these
latter activities are reproductions within the meaning of copyright law, we first need
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to make a distinction between the terms ‘expression’, ‘form’ and ‘format’. By use of
the term ‘expression’, we refer to the way by which the author has fixed her work; for
instance, the way that she has selected and ordered the words in her book. It is when
the ‘expression’ of the work is copied that the reproduction right is infringed. The term
‘form’ is used to refer to the way in which the ‘expression’ is recorded from a techni-
cal perspective. For instance, a book may be recorded in analogue or digital ‘form’,
while in both cases carrying the same ‘expression’. ‘Format’ is the technological spec-
ification of the ‘form’. For instance, a book in digital form may be recorded in a text-
file or an image-file ‘format’.
Scanning consists in the process of transposing the information contained in a work
from analogue into digital ‘form’ – from symbols perceptible and understandable by
the human senses into a series of ones and zeros. This activity is highly likely to qual-
ify as an act of reproduction.101 This is because the passage from the typographical
character to the numerical token does not change the ‘expression’ underlying the
work; the ‘expression’ is used as a basis and the work is translated from one ‘form’ to
another.
OCR-ing, on the other hand, modifies the ‘format’ of the work by converting the
image file that has been created via scanning into a text file.102 Even though the
‘copy’ of the work created through OCR-ing is not meant to be perceived by human
intelligence but to be readable by computers, nevertheless it is not the ‘expression’ of
the work but the ‘format’ into which the work is recorded that is still subject to modi-
fication. Whereas OCR-ing deeply impacts on the reproduction right, since the
‘expression’ comprising the work is copied and remains intact as such, under some
jurisdictions it could qualify as a transformative use, insofar as the use made appoints
the copy a new function or purpose. And whereas in Europe this kind of use is highly
unlikely to escape from infringing liability on the grounds of transformativeness, it
may be found transformative and hence permissible under US copyright law.103 As
indicated earlier, the test for evaluating whether a use is transformative in the US
requires that the work is employed in a different manner or for a different purpose
from that of the original.104 Even if OCR-ing passes the scrutiny of this test under the
merits of a specific case, most jurisdictions would be slow to accept that it escapes
infringement for being transformative. In Europe, for instance, this process would
most likely fit within the description of an act of reproduction and would be held
infringing once carried out without authorial consent.105
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Case C-5/08 [2009] ECDR 16, § 18–19.
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Nonetheless, the purpose for which scanning and OCR-ing are carried out could be
a valid determinant for their lawfulness. Copying for the sole purpose of indexing and
search enhances the dissemination of information about the work, while it does not
impinge upon its communication to the public. In this respect it should be exempt
from infringement, even in cases where the reproduction is not authorized by the rele-
vant rightholder or is addressed to the public.
However, the legitimacy of the activities that follow copying in the context of mass
digitization remains questionable. Below, we examine the status of automated
processing of copyright works from the viewpoint of the purpose of processing. We
will attempt to make some distinctions based on copyright principles.
2 Copyright and the automated processing of works
As has always been the case in copyright, copying is merely a prerequisite for other
activities to take place.106 Traditionally, the most common activities following
copying were, broadly speaking, the dissemination and the use of the work.
Copying carried out with an exploitative purpose, such as that of distribution on
commercial scale, is reserved by copyright, whereas dealing with the copies in a
purely consumptive way is normally exempt from infringement.107 This finds
ground in the theoretical argument that the use of works is meant to enhance the
understanding of the content of works, while the dissemination of copies to the
public is associated with the exploitation of the expression embodied in works. In
this light, the way in which the copies are dealt with is very important in determin-
ing the lawfulness of copying, despite the fact that unauthorized reproductions are
infringing as such, by forming the basis of a broadly defined exclusive right in every
copyright system.108
In the context of mass digitization, once the works are copied, they are automati-
cally processed for a series of different purposes, from plain search and indexing to
more complex data mining and text analysis. This form of dealing with copies, namely
automated processing, bears prima facie no resemblance to any currently known form
of dealing with copies, namely: dissemination and use. It appears to be a new kind of
dealing with works that follows copying. First, it is almost self-evident that it is not a
public dissemination since the copies are not displayed to humans. Is this conclusive
evidence that there is no infringement? Secondly, it is contestable whether non-
display uses are what the term refers to, at least in a copyright sense: ‘uses’. We
address these issues in the following subsections.
(a) Dissemination to the public and dissemination to machines
The creation of copies with a view to disseminate them to the public has traditionally
been viewed, and still is considered, as implicit within the meaning of the reproduction
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Deazley, ‘Commentary on the Engravers’ Act (1735)’, in L Bently and M Kretschmer (eds),
Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900) (2008) <http://www.copyrighthistory.org>.
107. See above (nn 90–93 and accompanying text) for the discussion of this dichotomy based
on personality rights argument.
108. See, for instance, Article 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC.
40 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, Vol. 1 No. 1
right.109 This argument is supported by copyright history. Reproduction as the process
of multiplying works was never meant to refer to ‘copying as such’, i.e. the isolated
act of making copies of a work for purposes other than public diffusion. Rather, repro-
duction implicitly encompassed ‘copying and selling’ or ‘copying for purposes of
publication’.110 So, unless the copies were disseminated to the public, copying did not
matter per se. Scholars have convincingly supported this view, namely that reproduc-
tion does not matter per se until and unless copies are meant to be disseminated to the
public. One of the arguments is that, in the digital environment, any use of the work
involves an act of reproduction; hence, the making of copies is no longer ‘a good
predictor of whether there will be distribution to the public’, and consequently of an
‘intent to infringe’,111 as was the case in the analogue world. Copies can be, and
normally are, made for purposes that cannot be realistically considered to be an
infringement.
When it comes to the automated processing of works in non-display uses, it is
almost obvious that it does not fit within the concept of dissemination to the public.112
This is because, under our current understanding of copyright doctrine, dissemination
inherently entails the concept of a public to which the copies are diffused, even in
cases where the public is only abstractly present, namely where there is only a possi-
bility that members of the public shall access the work. Yet, this concept of the public,
however broadly defined, is missing from activities related to automated process-
ing.113 Not only is the public excluded from this type of dealing with copies, but it
also becomes unprecedentedly irrelevant! In a way, the copyright-doctrinal dipole
between public and private activities seems like an outdated distinction, valid only in
the display world of dissemination. Since dissemination as a form of dealing with
copies is inextricably linked with the presence of the public, entailing even a mere
possibility of public access, the automated processing of works does not constitute an
act of dissemination in this sense.
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Nevertheless, non-display uses of digital copies entail massive activities associated
with the dissemination of data to machines. For instance, in non-consumptive
research, as defined in the Agreement, copyright works in the form of data are trans-
ferred to ‘qualified users’ in order to perform computational text analysis.114 More
generally, dealing with digital copies may entail transfer of data to third parties to
process these data on a non-display basis. Data may be aggregated with other data and
processed by different parties for different purposes. In this light, the dissemination of
works from machine to machine is likely to be the most common operation within the
spectrum of non-display uses!
There are two main questions arising in this context. The first is whether this form
of dissemination is innocent on the mere ground that it does not touch upon the public.
This question has never been tested under copyright law, which is and remains a law
of public places.115 Copyright essentially conceives the activities connected with a
work as aimed at either public dissemination or use. ‘Dissemination’ in the copyright
sense does not cover the dealing with works qua machine-processable data. This
brings about the second question as to whether non-display uses of digital copies of
works are what their title refers to: ‘uses’. Subject to examination, below is our current
understanding of what a copyright use is with a view to ascertaining whether non-
display uses fall under this kind of use.
(b) Uses of works and uses on works
The concept of ‘use’ in the context of copyright protection has not been defined by
statutes, despite the fact that it is a benchmark concept underpinning copyright. The
use of copyright works, however, has always remained outside copyright’s exclusiv-
ity. As opposed to other disciplines of intellectual property, such as patent law, copy-
right has stopped short of granting exclusive use rights.116 As long as works are
communicated to others through publication, anyone is allowed to make free use of
them, and authors have no right to exercise control over the use that is made. This is
because, through publication, the author grants an ex ante implied licence to the public
to carry out a certain range of uses. The scope of this implied licence may be subject
to variations according to the technology used in the publication of the work.117
Practically, this means that the ways of appropriating the content of a work through
use are unpredictable and not subject to authorial control. So, a copyright use may be
purely consumptive, in terms of appropriating the content of works, but it could also
extend, for example, to the study or research of various aspects of works. Those
aspects could include language, style and structure. In this respect, a use may lead to
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associating a work with other works. However broad in scope, copyright use is the
most welcome outcome of the bequest of works through publication and there are no
legal restrictions on how this use is going to be made, insofar as it does not affect the
sphere of exclusive rights granted by copyright laws.118
Going through the applicable copyright exceptions and limitations, one can track
down four main types of copyright use. Those include consumptive,119 educational,120
informational121 and creative122 uses. While these uses differ as to the purpose for
which they are carried out, they have one thing in common: they are made with a view
to appropriate, or enable the appropriation of, the content of works by human users.
For instance, consumptive uses involve the pure personal enjoyment of a work, via
reading, viewing or listening to it.123 Educational and informational uses are premised
upon fundamental freedoms and as such they are exempt from infringement irrespec-
tive of the fact that the copies of works may be disseminated to others to appropri-
ate.124 In creative uses too, the content of a work needs to be appropriated so as to
become part of a creative process and result in the creation of new expression that is
original in its own right, while still embodying elements of the original work.125 All
aforementioned categories of uses are in essence uses of the work since they princi-
pally involve the appropriation of its content.
Despite the probably misguiding employment of the term ‘use’ in the context of
non-display uses, the copies made to be further automatically processed do not
comfortably fit in the currently known types of copyright use. This is because they are
not made in the context of appropriating the content of works – an activity which is
supposed to be practised by human beings only. Rather, they are carried out with a
view to automatically processing the expression of works. They are in essence uses on
the work. This is affirmed by the very definition appointed, for instance, to ‘Non-
Consumptive Research’ in the Google Books Settlement Agreement. As we saw
earlier, non-consumptive research is defined to refer to ‘research in which computa-
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tional analysis is performed on one or more Books, but not research in which a
researcher reads or displays substantial portions of a Book to understand the intellec-
tual content presented within the Book’.126
Certainly, uses on works may facilitate uses of works. By this, we mean that auto-
mated processing may enhance the accessibility of works to users so that the latter appro-
priate the content of works. This includes automated processing that is carried out for the
purposes of indexing and search. When a work which was only available on physical
carrier is scanned and OCR-ed, and is then made available for searching on a publicly
accessible network, the user is undoubtedly facilitated in having access to it. Regardless
of whether the work as such is displayed or not, or if it is displayed only in part, the user
is facilitated in operations that are preliminary or ancillary to the work’s use properly so-
called, such as: locating the work itself, obtaining basic information over it, identifying
interesting parts in it. Automated processing for purposes of indexing and search is,
therefore, a use on the work which may be considered as subsidiary to uses of works. As
far as this kind of automated processing is limited and proportionate to use-subsidiarity,
it may be considered permissible under copyright law and principles, insofar as it does
not have impact upon any of the exclusive rights of dissemination127.
There is, however, yet another category of uses on works that facilitate uses of
works. These include automated processing that is carried out for purposes of compu-
tational analysis, i.e. for non-consumptive research. As we have discussed previously,
most of these uses do in fact aim at facilitating the understanding of the work’s
content, for instance by means of automatic text analysis, or by supplying ‘user-
friendly’ tools such as the automatic translation or automatic extraction of associations
and of key ideas.128 These uses on works, however, do not seem to be merely
‘subsidiary’ to uses of works. Obviously, their true status can only be ascertained on
a case-by-case basis, but to a large extent they are not just subsidiary; they are, rather,
substitutive to the use of the work. Once a user has been ‘facilitated’ in the use of a
book to an extent that reading the book becomes superfluous or even immaterial to
understanding the book itself, we might safely conclude that such use on the book has
substituted the use thereof. In the light of copyright principles, the legitimacy of these
‘uses on’ is not so straightforward as it may be in the previous case.129
Finally, there are uses on works that do not aim at facilitating uses of works but are
carried out for other purposes. These include automated processing for data mining.
Analysis on the search patterns of users for the purposes of personalized advertise-
ment, for instance, seems to be totally irrelevant with the function and nature of copy-
right use. One might argue that these uses are part of a distribution model which is
aimed at making more books available to the public, and as such they indirectly facil-
itate the use of books. Yet, precisely in this light, these uses are more similar to acts
of exploitation than those of use, and as such they are more likely to fall outside the
copyright understanding of ‘use’.
Uses on works are essentially different than uses of works. Yet, this distinction does
not appear clearly in the light of copyright principles. At the same time, it inevitably
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raises the question as to whether this shift in the way that works are used means that
the works cease to be used as works but are used as something else. This is because
the subject matter of copyright is essentially the work – not the work as a container of
data.
3 Works as works and works as data
While for many years copyright has been presumed to be regulating the ‘intangibles’,
works have never been ‘intangible’ ipso facto. The practicalities of the analogue world
required the embodiment of works in a physical carrier to meet the ‘fixation’ require-
ment130; this means that the intellectual creation, namely the work, had to be attached
to a physical embodiment, i.e. a copy. With digitalization, things changed. The digital
age came with a separation of the intellectual object from its physical embodiment.
This marked a shift not only in the way that copyright is being regulated, through the
introduction of new rights and the initiation of anti-circumvention provisions,131 but
also in copyright language. Interestingly, with dematerialization it is quite common to
refer to works in digital form as copyright ‘content’. Certainly, this linguistic shift
does not feature in copyright statutes. A careful reading of the statutes, however, indi-
cates that this shift has occurred. For instance, the ‘material’ distribution right
provided under Article 4 of Directive 2001/29/EC132 covers works and copies thereof,
whereas the ‘immaterial’ distribution rights of Article 3 refer to ‘works’ only.133 The
difference in the wording used to frame the scope of the aforementioned rights seems
to adhere to the new reality brought about by technological change, namely that works
have been denuded of the necessity for a tangible carrier and can thereof flow as
‘content’ within online networks.
With mass digitization, there is yet another shift that has occurred. While digitiza-
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tion turns works into ‘de-materialized’ ‘content’, mass digitization turns content into
‘de-intellectualized’ ‘data’. This means that the expression of the idea embodied in the
work is not primarily used to communicate the ‘speech’ of the author to the public but
rather to form the basis of machine-workable algorithms. In this context, digital works
may be purely treated and dealt with as containers of data; uses on them can be made
along with uses of them.
At this point, one could perhaps argue that once the works are not used as works
but as something else, no copyright infringement occurs plainly because this kind of
use exceeds the scope of protection afforded by copyright. Examples pertaining to
physical property provide support to this argument. For instance, using heavy books
as door-stops has nothing to do with copyright; or placing CDs on cars’ rear wind-
screens to dodge speed traps in Italy or hanging CDs on balconies in Greece as
pigeon-deterrents can only contribute to some sort of couleur locale but not amount
to copyright infringements. This is because copyright provides no right to the copy-
right holder to control the physical embodiments of their works once sold. This is the
core meaning of the exhaustion principle. Yet, it should be borne in mind that the
aforementioned examples, under which works are not used as works but as something
else, are borrowed from physical property.
Finding similar examples in the context of the ideational component comprising
works is rather difficult. A good one comes from trade mark law. Whereas the use of
a trade mark in the course of trade is restricted to the proprietor of the mark, its use in
a different context does not raise issues of infringing liability. This is because trade
marks function as badges of origin, i.e. as indications that the products or services
bearing the mark originate from the same manufacturer.134 In this light, the use of a
trade mark as a trade mark is infringing, but its use as something else is not, in the
sense that the property right of the trade mark owner to be identified as such is not
affected.
The question arises as to whether the same conclusion applies in respect of the use
of copyright works not as works but as something else, for instance as machine-
processable data. To answer this question, we need to understand the essential differ-
ence between copyright works and trade marks. This lies in the way that these objects
of intellectual property protection convey the information contained in them to the
public. Trade marks function in a direct way, that is the trade mark owner uses the
mark to convey the message that it is he who uses the mark; in turn, when members
of the public come across the mark they (have to) recognize that the product or serv-
ice bearing the mark originates from that owner. This is not the case with copyright
works. Their function is not to indicate that a specific work originates from a specific
author. In fact, indications that might serve this function, such as the title of the book
or meta-data extracted from it, can hardly qualify as original and hence be eligible for
copyright protection.135 As opposed to trade marks, the function of copyright works
as works involves a circular process: the author, through a blend of originality and
fixation, expresses his idea(s), namely he creates a copyright work. The users then
have the possibility of getting back to the author’s idea(s) via the appropriation of the
content of work. So, starting off with the idea(s) an author communicates his or her
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original expression to the public so that the public is carried back to that idea through
content appropriation. Unless a user reads a book or listens to the music, the work
only carries the capacity of functioning as a work; it is this possibility of appropria-
tion of the ideational component of works that distinguishes copyright works from
other objects of intellectual property and that forms the inherent nature and purpose
of works.
It is because of the inherent circularity of this process that some see a work as an
act rather than an object. Because of this powerful dialectic relationship that works
generate between the author and the users it seems convenient to look at works as acts
of communication rather than as objects of property.136
The question arises as to whether authors should have the capacity of objecting to
uses that contravene, and interfere with, the inherent nature and purpose of works.
Answering this question proves extremely difficult, since at no stage of copyright
history has the use of works affected, or had an impact on, this inherent purpose and
function. So, to see whether authors have a right to object to non-display uses as viola-
tions of the purpose and function of works, we need to revert to some guidance in
copyright principles. As we have discussed in Part One, the author’s entitlement over
non-display uses may be justified under the different approaches to copyright.137
However, it is from a personality theory point of view that this entitlement attains its
clearest stance as regulatory principle. Under this approach, the possibility of content
appropriation is, as we illustrated earlier, ‘the sole destination and the value’ of an
object such as a literary work.138 In this light, publication serves as a means of
enhancing the possibility of content appropriation rather than of reproducing the work
in the same way with the author, reproduction being a use that is ‘different and sepa-
rate from the use to which the object was directly appointed’.139 The fact that repro-
duction has been so far the only meaningful case of a use that is not related to the
intended function of the work does not mean that this should remain the only restricted
use of an author’s work. The personality theory could justify a right of the author to
have her work used as work, namely in the context of content appropriation, but not
as something else, since this could come into conflict with the inherent purpose of the
work.
Whereas the issue of the authorial entitlement to object to uses of her work that are
unrelated to the intended function of the work has never been discussed with reference
to copyright works; it has been examined in the context of personal data. The use of
personal data and information for purposes which are entirely unrelated to that for
which they were initially released is normally considered to be a violation of the right
of the data subject. Some argue that this holds true even when the personal data is
anonymized, thereby excluding any possible harm to the data subject.140 This is
because, as Deryck Beyleveld has put it, ‘the information has been obtained from the
personal information [that the data subject] provided, and would not exist other-
wise’.141 Therefore, the individual’s legal interest in personal information not being
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used in ways contrary to their judgement and beliefs is not exhausted with the first
release of the information.
Should a similar approach be applied to copyright works, then the author might
have a legal interest in that her work is used as work, and not for entirely unrelated
purposes. Below, we examine how some principles of data protection law could apply,
by analogy, in respect of the automated processing of copyright works.
4 Automated processing of works as data: a lesson from data protection law?
With mass digitization, works are dealt with as containers of data, and the copies of
works are automatically processed. This bears an instantaneous analogy to the protec-
tion afforded to personal data, which in Europe is governed by Directive 95/46/EC.142
Article 2(b) of this Directive defines the ‘processing of personal data’ as ‘any opera-
tion or set of operations, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment
or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’.143 This definition of automated
processing bears a strong resemblance to the automated processing of copyright
works. The processing of works is an operation carried out by automated means and
includes the collection of works, their recording via scanning and OCR-ing, their stor-
age in a corpus of data, their consultation or use for non-consumptive research as well
as their dissemination to machines. Deprived of intelligibility, the millions of books
that comprise the corpus of a digital repository become the content of a massive data-
base containing any potentially valuable information related to the works and the uses
thereof. It was probably for this reason that some commentators have compared
Google Books to the Human Genome in terms of historical significance.144 But
perhaps historical significance is not the only analogy that can be drawn from these
two cases; it may be that an analogy of copyrighted works to personal data can be
substantiated in terms of automated processing, since the structure and function of
databases containing copyright works or personal data is astonishingly similar. Below,
we examine the case of population genetic databases, as an example where the use of
personal information for purposes different from that for which it was initially
released – and for which informed consent were obtained – has been successfully
regulated by law.
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(a) Use of personal information for unrelated purposes: the case of population
genetic databases
Population genetic databases are large collections of biological samples and personal
details of individuals belonging to a given population, which aim at covering a whole
population of a region or a significant sample of it.145 One of the central legal ques-
tions about these collections is whether the consent of individuals must be sought
before carrying out certain uses of the information. Central to this question is what
form such consent should take. It is a well-established principle that informed consent
must be given for personal information to be used for medical research, in the form of
‘explicit and specific consent’.146 This includes both consent in having personal infor-
mation and biological material included in the database and consent in making use of
information and material for a specific research purpose. However, obtaining new
consent for uses that were not predictable at the time the information was released
might be too burdensome or even impracticable.147 In these circumstances, ‘generic
consent’ may be acceptable. So, once an individual has consented for her data to be
used in a given research, there is a reasonable presumption that she will give consent
to other uses that fit in the same objective of promoting public health.148 For instance,
in the Icelandic Health Sector Database, one of the largest population genetic data-
bases in the world,149 material was included on an opt-out basis, even though it was
initially collected without consent. This meant that individuals had the right to have
their material excluded from the database without their consent being required to
collect and make use of it.150
However broad in scope, the doctrine of ‘general consent’ is subject to limitations.
First, the consent cannot be presumed to cover any uses of the information, but only
those that are reasonably consistent with a goal of public utility. This is because, as
Graeme Laurie observes, when personal information are released for a given purpose
there is a ‘legitimate expectation of use’,151 namely an expectation that the informa-
tion is not used for entirely unrelated purposes. Second, even when the data are
collected and used without specific consent, the individual has to be given the right to
opt out. Although this right can be exercised unconditionally, there is also a right to
object to specific uses of own information or genetic material on grounds of moral or
personal beliefs.152
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Should we translate these principles in the case of digital libraries, we could argue
that works can be safely included in the corpus, on a non-display basis, and on the
ground of ‘generic consent’ from authors in having their works made searchable by
the public. This would include consent in having the work automatically processed for
purposes that are reasonably consistent with this goal. Copying for indexing and
search may be safely considered to be consistent, in spite of the fact that it formally
infringes the reproduction right. On the other hand, automated processing for data
mining and text mining are certainly exceeding the scope of such implied consent!
The more these uses are unrelated with uses of the work as work – and for which a
‘generic consent’ can be presumed to be given once the work is published – the more
the uses are likely to be restricted.
(b) Processing data – processing works: purpose limitation and proportionality
Directive 95/46/EC lays down the framework under which the processing of personal
data may be lawful.153 In principle, personal data should not be processed, unless
certain conditions are met. These conditions fall into three broad categories, namely
informed consent, proportionality and legitimate purpose. Under which conditions
may the same principles apply to the automated processing of works?
Works and personal data are both substantive determinations of one’s personal-
ity.154 This is empirically manifested by the fact that both works and personal data are
disclosure-sensitive; they are meant to be kept private unless their rightful owner
wishes to disclose them to the public. They differ, however, as to the purpose for
which they are disclosed. As we have discussed earlier, works are published with the
aim of being shared with other human beings, which, by means of publication, are put
in the condition of appropriating the intellectual content of the work. Personal data,
normally, are disclosed only for specific purposes, such as the delivery of a service or
the completion of a process. Any use beyond the specific purpose is restricted, simply
because, unlike works, personal data are not meant to be public per se. While works
are acts of communication, i.e. words expressly addressed to the attention of the
public, personal data are un-addressed signs which may be communicated to others in
given circumstances.
In spite of this essential difference, works and personal data share at least one
element in common: they are both disclosed for a purpose. Clearly, unlike with
personal data, the ‘specific purpose’ for which a single work is disclosed cannot be
taken into account in copyright, which is and remains a content-neutral law. Rather,
in case of works, the generic purpose of allowing appropriation of the content – what-
ever the content is – by members of the public can and must be taken into account. If
this is the case, when automatically processed, copyright works also raise an issue of
‘legitimate expectation of use’, namely an expectation that the work is not processed
for purposes which are entirely unrelated to that of making the work’s content appro-
priable by humans. Just as the anonymization of personal data does not ‘purify’ all
subsequent uses of the data,155 the non-display of copyright works does not indemnify
each and every use of works. Only uses which the author may legitimately expect, in
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order that work is accessed by the public, are indemnified by the non-displaying
provision. Still, uses exceeding this purpose cannot be deemed to be lawful on the
mere ground that they do not display the work to the public.
The concept of legitimate expectation is closely related to the ‘purpose limitation
principle’ and to the principle of ‘proportionality’.
Under the purpose limitation principle, the processing of personal data is lawful
only when it is carried out for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and it should
not be done in a way that is incompatible with those purposes.156 Practically, this
means that the data controller should state a legitimate purpose for which the process-
ing is done and should not exceed the scope of this purpose. As Kotschy rightly
observes, the controller who wishes to process data should at the moment of their
collection define a specific and lawful purpose for which the processing of the data is
required.157 Should the purpose limitation principle apply as regards the automated
processing of copyrighted works, the digital copies of works should be processed only
in the context of a specified legitimate purpose; processing that exceeds this purpose
would be infringing. In mass digitization, and in the Google Books project in partic-
ular, this purpose should not exceed the legitimately expected use of a work as work,
namely its use in the context of content appropriation by humans. In this light, auto-
mated processing for indexing and search can qualify as a legitimate purpose. Any
further processing, such as computational analysis and data mining, may exceed the
scope of this purpose and could be considered as infringing.
The proportionality principle applicable in respect of the processing of personal data
is laid down in Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC. Under this principle, personal data may
be processed only insofar as the processing is adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purpose for which the data are collected and/or further processed.158 In
this context, ‘relevance’ should be interpreted as strictly as possible.159 Applied in the
context of copyright, this principle could read: ‘the work may be processed only insofar
as this is adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it has
been reproduced’. Indeed, the application of the proportionality principle would mean
that copying for automated processing should be relevant and not excessive in relation
to the purpose for which works are normally published; this includes the enhancement
of accessibility through indexing and search. Yet, there is an implicit limit here: acces-
sibility should not affect the author’s exploitative rights, namely it should not go beyond
the modes of exploitation that the author is legally entitled to employ.
CONCLUSION
Whereas, up to date, the use of copyright works was associated with content appro-
priation by humans, works can now be automatically processed for various purposes
without their expression being displayed and without their content being appropriated
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by humans. Certainly, the regulation of these activities and the definition of their legal
boundaries cannot be left to private ordering mechanisms. The use of works on a non-
display basis is massive and entails the potential of unprecedentedly changing the way
we use our cultural heritage. So, while mass digitization promises accessibility to all
world information, the legitimacy of its underlying activities remains questionable.
Even though non-display uses may qualify as transformative and, hence, permitted in
the US, this is not the case in Europe. From the perspective of copyright principles,
too, the legitimacy of non-display uses is contestable. First, non-display uses repre-
sent a very lucrative market for the near future, whereas, at the same time, they take
place without authorial consent and without any sort of remuneration to authors.
Secondly, non-display uses could have some unprecedented impact upon the way in
which an author chooses to ‘speak’ freely to the public. This is because the associa-
tions that non-display uses are in the capacity of generating may interfere with the
function of a work as an act of communication. Finally, and most importantly, non-
display uses may not fit the sole purpose and function for which works are created and
disseminated, namely their appropriation by other human beings.
Under the copyright doctrine, there are two main ways of dealing with copies of
works. Those are the dissemination and the use of copies. We have seen that auto-
mated processing – an activity which underlies every so-called ‘non-display use’ –
does not fit comfortably in any of these kinds of dealing with copies. It entails
dissemination, but not dissemination in the conventional sense; copies are distributed
to machines and networks and not to human beings as has been so far the case. At
the same time, automated processing cannot purely qualify as a ‘use’ of works,
despite the probably misguiding employment of the term in the context of ‘non-
display uses’. We have noticed that while copyright has – up to date – been about
uses of works in terms of appropriating the content, automated processing involves
uses on works. In this context, we have argued that when uses on works facilitate
uses of works, i.e. when they are subsidiary or ancillary to conventional uses, they
should raise no infringement issue. This includes automated processing for indexing
and search. Nonetheless, when uses on works become substitutive, or totally irrele-
vant, to uses of works, their legitimacy is not equally straightforward. These latter
categories of uses on works include automated processing for computational analy-
sis and for data mining.
This distinction between uses on, and of, works inevitably raised the question as to
whether this shift in the way that works are used means that the works cease to be used
as works but are used as something else. We have observed that while digitization
turns works into ‘de-materialized’ ‘content’, mass digitization turns content into ‘de-
intellectualized’ ‘data’. The fact that works are not used as works but as data does not
mean that authors are not in capacity of objecting to this kind of use. Quite on the
contrary, some non-display uses contravene, and interfere with, the internal purpose
and function of works, namely content appropriation, as the sole destination and the
value of a work. In this light, this kind of use may be in conflict with authors’ rights.
Given that some non-display uses may be infringing from the perspective of copy-
right principles and since the automated processing of works as data and that of
personal data present striking similarities, we have sought some answers as to the
regulation of non-display uses from data protection law. We have seen that in the
context of genetic databases, the use of personal data should be in compliance at least
with the generic consent of the data subject. The same ought to apply to the automated
processing of digital works, whereby generic consent would include the use of works
in a way that the author is legitimately presumed to expect, most notably for content
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appropriation. At the same time, digital copies of works should be processed only in
the context of a specified legitimate purpose, not exceeding the legitimately expected
use of a work as work; copying for automated processing should be relevant and not
excessive in relation to the purpose for which works are normally published, namely
to be used in the context of content appropriation.
This new form of dealing with works promises to change for ever the way in which
humankind will make use of information, knowledge and the whole of its common
cultural heritage. Along with the promise, however, comes the challenge; almost
inevitably, this new kind of copyright use begs for a redefinition of the contemporary
copyright space: a space in which works will continue to flow though the visible and
invisible channels opened up by technological change, and to feed human coales-
cence.
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